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Chapter 13
Can VEBAs Alleviate Retiree Health-Care
Problems?
Aaron Bernstein
Recent negotiations between the United Auto Workers (UAW) and Detroit
automakers have focused attention on a potentially innovative response to
the costly problem of retiree health insurance. To alleviate the companies’
chronic losses, the union agreed to establish Voluntary Employees’ Benefi-
ciary Associations (VEBAs) at General Motors (GM) Corporation, Ford
Motor Corporation, and Chrysler Corporation. These nonprofit trusts,
which are run by an independent board of trustees, were set up to assume
responsibility for UAW retirees’ medical care starting in 2010, allowing the
three companies to remove a total of more than $100 billion in long-term
liability from their books (Maynard and Chapman 2007). When the trusts
are up and running, the UAW and its retired members will shoulder the
risk of ensuring that the funds are sufficient to cover the cost of future
medical inflation. As medical inflation increases the cost of retiree health
care, workers increasingly face the issue of how they can pay for it and
whether they should try to put aside funds for this purpose along with other
post-employment saving.
A Detroit-style employee VEBA poses a complex challenge for labor in
both the private and public sectors. Union members in VEBAs funded at
least partially by employers enjoy tax breaks denied to nonunion employees.
As a result, such trusts can be a tax-efficient way for organized workers
to save for post-employment health coverage. However, for unionized
employees covered by an employer-paid plan, it may be a second-best
option to go along with a GM-style defeasance VEBA, so-called because it
allows employers to sever their debt obligations for health-care legacy
costs. The first portion of this chapter describes the general history of
VEBAs and why they have surfaced as an issue at unionized companies.
Next, we examine the advent of stand-alone employee VEBA like those
under construction in the auto industry. We then focus on the bargain-
ing trade-offs made by GM and the UAW as they negotiated the new
employee VEBA, and how the agreement they reached in 2007 stood up
when GM went through a bankruptcy reorganization in 2009. Finally, we
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look at VEBAs in the larger context of declining retiree health coverage
in the United States and discuss ways in which the idea could address
the issue for both union and nonunion employees. We also examine
how employee VEBAs may apply in the public sector, where many
employers face legacy costs as burdensome as those in the auto and
steel industries.
Why VEBAs came to the fore
A VEBA is a tax-exempt trust as defined under Section 501(c) (9) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Its purpose is to give employers and/or employees
a tax-advantagedmethod for funding not just medical care, but virtually any
qualified employee benefit, such as dental care, prescription drugs, life and
accident insurance, or vision care. VEBAs even can be used to pay for things
like vacations, child care, training, education, legal expenses, or supple-
mental unemployment benefits (Richardson and Salemi 2007). They can
do so not just for employees but also for their spouses and dependents.
Federal law sets low limits on how much money employers and employ-
ees can put into a VEBA for nonunion workers, which restricts their
usefulness for most of the US workforce. But for those who qualify, they
offer one of the best tax breaks available. If set up properly, contributions
by employers and employees alike are not taxed going in, any earnings the
trust makes over the years are not taxed, and the money withdrawn to cover
a retiree’s medical care is not taxed either (Richardson and Salemi 2007).
This surpasses the tax benefits available through conventional retirement
plans such as a pension or 401(k), whose distributions in retirement are
fully taxable.
VEBAs also are remarkably flexible. They can be set up as individual
accounts akin to a 401(k), in which contributions are made by the employ-
er, the employee, or both. Or they can be a ‘commingled trust’ that
functions more like a traditional defined benefit (DB) pension and pays
a fixed dollar amount to cover qualified benefits. Companies also can use a
hybrid approach, in which the trust is funded by a defined contribution
(DC) such as a lump sum, yet pays the premiums of a traditional health
plan. Employers can decide whether to fund a VEBA themselves or require
employees to pay part or all of the contribution. Some VEBAs in the public
sector even use sick days or other compensable time off as a funding
source. The employer contributes the value of the time off, either annually
or on a onetime basis when the employee retires (Richardson and Salemi
2007).
Most of the 11,996 VEBAs in existence as of 2008 were set up by employ-
ers as tax-advantaged funding schemes (IRS 2008). A VEBA board selects
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professional investment managers and investment vehicles and decides on
distribution options and levels (NCPERS 2006). The new VEBAs at the auto
companies will be run independently of the companies. Although called
stand-alone or employee VEBAs to emphasize the point that employees
bear all the risk that the employer has severed, these trusts are legal entities
separate from both the employer and the union.
VEBAs first appeared in the early twentieth century as a way for workers
to fund insurance for life, health, and accident, as well as other benefits
that employers typically did not cover at the time. After several courts
decided that they should be taxed, Congress granted them tax-exempt
status in 1928 (McGuinness 2007). The tax rules changed several times in
subsequent decades, most drastically in 1984. That year, Congress imposed
low limits on how much employers could contribute to a VEBA and re-
quired companies to pay unrelated business income tax on any annual
gains earned on funds exceeding the limits. The purpose was to crack down
on companies abusing VEBAs as tax shelters (Schultz and Francis 2007).
Nevertheless, VEBAs at unionized employers remained exempt from the
restrictions, so workers there can make tax-free contributions and receive
tax-free benefits from the VEBA (Employee Benefit Research Institute
2005). As a result, these have remained popular at companies with large
unionized workforces in both the public and private sectors. The trusts
have been especially prevalent in industries such as utilities, where the
annual employer contributions can be built into the rate base, and in
defense, where companies can build them into cost-plus federal contracts
(Schultz and Francis 2007). Typically, employers use them to pre-fund their
long-term retiree health obligations. VEBAs also are used for this purpose
by multiemployer health and welfare plans, which usually involve a union
that has set up a plan covering members at multiple companies.
VEBAs are attractive to companies for another reason as well. Just like a
corporate pension fund, any extra returns earned by the company-spon-
sored plan are included in a company’s bottom line (assuming the plan is a
traditional one and not the newer stand-alone variety such as in the auto
industry). For example, Procter & Gamble Company’s VEBA added more
than $600 million to the company’s earnings in 2005 and 2006 (Schultz
and Francis 2007). Indeed, despite the 1984 limitations, the number of
VEBAs in the United States more than doubled in the 1970s and 1980s,
reaching a peak of 15,048 in 1993 (Figure 13.1).
While few employer surveys shed light on the reasons for this growth, it
likely stemmed, in part, from companies’ desires to save funds to defray the
mounting costs of an aging workforce, especially in mature unionized
industries. Retirees also were living longer, further ratcheting up a long-
term obligation that employers could use VEBAs to fund. It was this
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swelling long-term liability that eventually led employers to the idea of
using VEBAs to transfer retiree health responsibility to union members.
This notion stems back to a 1990 regulatory action that for the first time
required employers to record retiree health obligations as a corporate
obligation. Until then, most employers simply paid the annual cost of
retiree health premiums out of their general budgets, an approach often
called ‘pay-as-you-go’ financing. But that year, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, which provides guidelines for the financial reports of
public corporations, issued Financial Accounting Statement (FAS) No. 106
(Fronstin 2005). Starting in late 1992, FAS 106 required companies to use
what is called an ‘actuarial accounting method,’ which requires them to
record a liability on their books for the total cost of all unfunded retiree
medical obligation. Put another way, companies had to state the present
value of what they would need to pay in the future for all retiree health
coverage, both for retirees and active workers.
Even before FAS 106 focused attention on the issue, concerns over
swelling legacy costs had begun to degrade the credit ratings and stock
values of employers with large ratios of retirees to active workers. But the
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Figure 13.1 Number of Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Associations (VEBAs) in
the United States, 1976–2008. Source: Author’s calculations using IRS (various
years).
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FAS move had a profound impact on employer-paid retiree health benefit
offerings. As a result, many corporations had decided that the expense was
simply too large and had begun abolishing retiree health insurance. Much
of the retrenchment came among large employers which had always been
more likely to offer retiree coverage than smaller ones (Fronstin 2005).
FAS 106 heightened the concern by requiring employers to post a liabili-
ty on their balance sheet that for many large corporations ran into the
millions or even billions. Some companies responded by taking a onetime
charge against their earnings. Other chose to stretch out the cost over
many years (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2005); a few were even
forced into bankruptcy (Richardson and Salemi 2007). Some experts be-
lieve this helped to accelerate the decline in retiree coverage. Employer-
paid insurance for early retirees, who need it the most before Medicare
kicks in, was offered by 46 percent of companies with 500 or more employ-
ees in 1993 but only 28 percent in 2004 (Fronstin 2005). Since then, the
number of VEBAs has drifted downward as well, to 11,996 in 2008 (IRS
2008).
Some private firms that elected to continue paying for retiree health
benefits decided to use VEBAs to pre-fund the obligations, as did some
public-sector employers (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2005). GM
itself had set up an internal VEBA years ago, long before it asked the UAW
to take over responsibility for retiree coverage. By the time the 2007 round
of bargaining began, GM had put away $16 billion into this preexisting
VEBA (GM Corporation 2007b).
Stand-alone employee VEBAs
The new employee VEBAs used by the three auto companies to shed legacy
costs have taken a different form from the traditional VEBA. These new
ones are DC trusts, into which the company puts a specified set of assets to
be used to cover all future benefits. Unlike a traditional pension or a DB
VEBA, a stand-alone VEBA carries no guarantee by the employer of a
certain level of benefits, leaving employees to bear the risk that the assets
will not keep pace with future medical inflation.
A tax lawyer’s phrase for what the auto companies have sought to do is
‘defeasance,’ which means setting aside assets to void a debt obligation.
Management-side labor lawyers dislike the term, since many companies
have asserted that retiree health is not a legal obligation at all. From
management’s perspective, the cost being shifted is one that many compa-
nies voluntarily took upon themselves and therefore represents a decision
they are free to reverse at any time.
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Employers’ legal right to stop paying for retiree health has long been a
point of contention between labor and management. Companies face
fewer legal hurdles for doing so than they do with pensions, since welfare
benefits such as retiree health do not vest under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). As a result, the question of whether a
company has incurred a legal obligation by offering retiree health coverage
over the years depends on the specific facts of what it told employees over
the years (Macey and O’Donnell 2003). The issue has been litigated at
many companies, with labor prevailing in some instances and management
in others. The outcome usually depends on whether employer statements
and other actions can be construed as an explicit or implied promise to
continue health coverage throughout employees’ retirement (Macey and
O’Donnell 2003).
While this legal uncertainty can make it difficult for employers to shed
retiree health coverage for unionized workers, it is far easier to do so when
a company enters bankruptcy. Seeking court protection from debtors
allows companies to reduce or eliminate almost all debts, which can obviate
the issue of whether retiree health is a legal obligation or not. After dozens
of steelmakers failed starting in the late 1990s, more than 200,000 United
Steelworker (USW) retirees and their dependents lost coverage as their
companies either restructured their debts or simply went out of business
(USW 2003).
As a result, most defeasance VEBAs have been set up at companies that
have either entered bankruptcy or faced the prospect of doing so (Ghilar-
ducci 2008). The UAW was involved in one of the earliest examples of this,
which was a VEBA set up in 1992 during the bankruptcy of International
Harvester Company (now called Navistar International Corporation). The
company put $500 million into the trust, enough to cover about half of the
projected liabilities, and it promised to pay more in subsequent years. This
trust continues to cover retirees, whose benefits have increased although
co-pays have risen somewhat (Welch and Byrnes 2007). Other experiences
have not fared as well, such as a VEBA the UAW agreed to at Detroit Diesel
Corporation that has already run out of cash (O’Conner 2007).
One of the most innovative uses of a VEBA involved an effort by the USW
union to salvage medical coverage lost following bankruptcies in the steel
industry. The effort, which started with the former LTV Corporation and
eventually came to involve three other bankrupt steel companies, illustrates
how VEBAs like those in the auto industry are typically part of a larger set of
bargaining trade-offs unions and employers make to balance the interests
of the employer as well as active and retired workers. In 2001, LTV went
into bankruptcy and began selling its assets; most of its workforce was laid
off, and retirees lost their health insurance.
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To save what it could, the USW began negotiating with investor Wilbur L.
Ross who sought to buy some of the company’s nearly shuttered steel mills.
In exchange for supporting his purchase the following year, the union
agreed to weaker work rules that allowed Ross’s newly formed International
Steel Group (ISG) Incorporated to reopen the mills with fewer workers,
higher productivity, and lower labor costs. The union also agreed that ISG
could buy LTV’s physical assets, leaving the $2.3 billion in retiree pension
and health obligations that had been a factor in the former company’s
demise to a shell company with insufficient assets to cover them. The
agreement left 70,000 retirees and dependents with no recourse except
to apply to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which
guarantees a portion of employee pension payments in case of bankrupt-
cies. They had no similar recourse for health coverage, which is not pro-
tected by the PBGC (Arndt 2003; Byrnes 2003). In return, Ross agreed to
rehire laid-off LTV workers as the company recovered and to negotiate a
new labor pact with the USW. The deal eventually came to cover Bethelem
Steel Corporation, AcmeMetals Incorporated, and Georgetown Steel (Ross
sold ISG and the company name was changed to ArcelorMittal USA).
Although the union’s priority was to save as many jobs as possible, it also
negotiated an unusual VEBA with Ross that, as of 2009, provided limited
health coverage for the four companies’ retirees. Because ISG, as it was know
then, had no profits and an uncertain future when the USW reached the
agreement in 2002, the two sides decided the company could not afford to
make any hard commitments to retiree health benefits. Instead, it set up a
VEBA that is funded by a percentage of operating cash flow per ton of steel
shipped (USW 2002). The arrangement paid nothing until 2005, when the
trust had accumulated enough money to start modest benefit coverage.
Initially retirees got prescription drug coverage for a co-pay of $10 a month
(USW 2006). The following year, as the company continued to earn profits,
the VEBA’s assets swelled to $469 million, enough to allow it to pick up the
tab for part of retirees’ Medicare Part B premium (Mittal Steel USA 2006).
The trust earned enough to repeat the benefit in 2007 (USW 2007a).
While such benefits are better than nothing, they are a far cry from full
coverage. The trust has not been able to build up a fund like those being
established in Detroit and at Goodyear, which will be able to guarantee at
least some level of benefits for many years. Instead, coverage for Arcelor-
Mittal retirees will fluctuate with the company’s fortunes (USW 2007b).
How GM and the UAW split cost and risk
While the USW’s experience at ArcelorMittal exemplifies how the innova-
tive use of a VEBA can aid retirees who would have otherwise lost all
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coverage, GM’s defeasance VEBA offers more lessons likely to be of use to a
broad cross-section of unions and employers. The primary obstacle faced
by employers that hope to shed a retiree health burden, in addition to
prevailing upon their unions to agree, is to find enough assets to fund the
trust at a level that would be likely to cover future medical inflation. For
unions, the key issue is ensuring that the trust will be funded as fully as
possible. During the 2007 negotiations, GM and the UAW devised a pack-
age of creative financing options that allowed them to reach a middle
ground on this central question.
This carefully crafted arrangement came undone in 2009 after the global
economic crisis led GM and Chrysler (although not Ford) to seek assistance
from the US government (Bunkley 2009). As part of that process, the
government asked the companies to substitute company stock for up to
half of the cash contributions the firms had agreed to make to the VEBAs
set up in 2007 (GM Corporation 2009a, 2009b). Subsequently, both GM
and Chrysler declared bankruptcy. Chrysler emerged in June through a
complex deal that split ownership in the new company in three ways. First,
the US government received an 8 percent stake in exchange for its $9
billion in loans; second, Fiat got a 20 percent share for providing Chrysler
with small-car designs and engines it can build and sell in the United States;
and third, the VEBA received 55 percent (Linebaugh 2009). Despite the
VEBA’s majority share, the UAW agreed that Fiat and the government
could name all of Chrysler’s new board of directors except one, which
the union chose itself. The following month GM also emerged from bank-
ruptcy via a similar restructuring deal. The new company’s ownership was
split four ways, with the US government getting 60.8 percent, the VEBA
receiving 17.5 percent, the Canadian and Ontario governments, which
contributed bailout funds, getting 11.7 percent, and the old GM keeping
10 percent (GM Corporation 2009a).
The substitution of stock for cash contributions from the companies
drastically altered the 2007 contract regarding the VEBAs, placing substan-
tially more risk onto UAW members and retirees. Still, the existence of the
VEBA gave the union a much stronger hand to play when GM and Chrysler
declared bankruptcy. The companies had entered into legal obligations
with the VEBA trusts that were more difficult for them to abrogate than
might have been the case if they had only had the prior disputed obliga-
tions to cover retiree health costs. As tangible legal entities, the VEBAs gave
the union a powerful bargaining tool that allowed them to extract equity on
an equal footing with the US and Canadian governments and Fiat, ahead of
GM and Chrysler bondholders. Without this privileged position, it is possi-
ble that UAW retirees could have lost more or even all of the retiree health
benefits they had fought for over the years.
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The intricate compromises the companies and the union reached when
they agreed to the VEBAs in 2007 shed light on the relatively powerful
bargaining position the UAW enjoyed when bankruptcy hit. The middle
ground they found then also covered a range of sensitive issues that others
would face in a similar process, including how much of the funding
expense would be borne by the company, by active workers, and by retires.
An examination of how these compromises allowed the parties to structure
and fund the new VEBA offers insights applicable to other industries. Its
flexibility in the face of the auto industry’s near-collapse a year later is
instructive as well. Not every union or employer would want or be able to
emulate every tactic, but any that pursue a defeasance VEBA would be well
served to learn from the UAW’s experience at GM.
The GM VEBA created in 2007 came about in very different circum-
stances from those at ArcelorMittal. It represents the culmination of a long
struggle by GM to shed its legacy costs. Successive CEOs at the company
had argued that ballooning UAW pension and health-care payments had
crippled the company’s ability to compete. In many ways, this argument
confuses cause and effect. After all, the company’s market share slid from
40 percent of the USmarket 20 years ago to just 25.5 percent in 2007 largely
because of its inability to design vehicles that were more appealing than
those offered by Japanese rivals (Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 2007). The
market share loss prompted the company to shed hundreds of thousands
of workers, which in turn lifted the ratio of retirees to active workers to
unsustainable levels.
Whatever the cause, GM, Ford, and Chrysler all still bore the burden of
the enormous sums they expend on legacy costs. GM has frequently point-
ed out in recent years that it is the single largest purchaser of health care in
the United States, providing coverage to 1,100,000 active and retired work-
ers and their dependents. The $5.4 billion GM spent on health care in
2005, more than two-thirds for retirees, added $1,045 to the average cost of
a GM vehicle. By contrast, its Japanese rivals paid just $450 per vehicle on all
health-care benefits, for active workers and retirees alike (Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals 2007).
GM first prevailed on the UAW to reduce retiree health cost in 2005. In
an unusual mid-contract concession, the union agreed to changes includ-
ing higher co-pays and deductibles that cut $17 billion off the company’s
$67.6 billion retiree health-care obligation (Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
2007). As part of that deal, it agreed to give up $5.6 billion worth of
negotiated future wage hikes and cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). In
return, the company offset a portion of the cutbacks by setting up a DC
VEBA funded with three $1 billion payments through 2011, plus at least
$30 million a year in profit-sharing payments and additional payments
based on increases in GM’s stock price (GM Corporation 2007a). This
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trust was called a ‘mitigation VEBA’ because it severed only a portion of the
company’s retiree health obligation, not all of it as the 2007 defeasance
VEBA was designed to do. During these negotiations, GM retained respon-
sibility for UAW retiree health coverage, which it will not once the 2007
stand-alone VEBA takes effect in 2010.
An analysis of why the UAW agreed to this extraordinary move sheds
light on its subsequent acceptance of the 2007 VEBA. The threats that
prompted the UAW to make both concessions were largely the same. In
2005, GM was struggling with deepening financial and competitive woes. Its
stock had fallen by more than half, from $53 in 2003 to $19 at the begin-
ning of 2005, and its credit rating had been slashed to junk status (Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals 2007). To address the problem, management
closed or idled factories, laid off 37,000 employees, and cut executive
salaries and dividends to shareholders. It also demanded that the UAW
agree to steep reductions in retiree health benefits. When the union
refused, GM threatened to impose them unilaterally, leaving the union
with a difficult decision. It could agree to bargain over the mid-contract
cuts in the hope of minimizing them, or it could refuse outright and sue if
GM cut them on its own. The downside to the latter strategy was that if GM
prevailed in court, management could emerge with the unilateral right to
eliminate retiree health benefits altogether.
A second threat the UAW faced was that a victory in court could turn out
to be a Pyrrhic one. In light of Wall Street’s negative view of GM’s future,
bankruptcy was a distinct possibility should the UAW prevail in a legal
battle over legacy costs. If that happened, as the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals pithily pointed out in a ruling on the legality of the 2005 cuts: ‘. . .
it is well to remember that the Federal Government’s Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, which provides pension guarantees for the employ-
ees and retirees of financially distressed companies, has no sister agency
that provides the same guarantees for retiree healthcare benefits’ (Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals 2007). In other words, if GM declared bankruptcy,
retirees could lose more than the $17 billion cutbacks the company de-
manded in 2005, perhaps even all their health coverage. In light of these
twin threats, the UAW decided that saving some benefits was better than
the risk involved in giving no ground at all.
The UAW made largely the same calculation during the 2007 contract
talks. However, this time, the two sides were discussing a full-scale defea-
sance VEBA that would take the entire remaining retiree health obligation
off GM’s books. The UAW insisted that in exchange for workers assuming
the responsibility for future coverage, the company had to fully fund the
trust. The arrangement the two sides eventually agreed on was based on an
intricate series of compromises. It allocated some of the funding cost to the
company and some to active workers (retirees were spared any further
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immediate cuts on top of the ones they suffered after the 2005 conces-
sions). It also split the risks the VEBA would entail for retirees between GM
and union members. Overall, the agreement allowed the UAW to assure its
members that they had wrested enough funding out of GM to ensure full
coverage for retirees (although only for what remained after the $17 billion
reduction in 2005). Yet it did so in a fashion that GM thought at the time
that it could afford, even its distressed circumstances.
The middle ground the parties reached in 2007 came on two levels: the
amount of the funding to be split between GM and union members, and
the key financial assumptions to be employed in the funding calculations.
The latter entailed an assessment of the costs the VEBA would incur, as well
as the returns its assets could be expected to realize to pay for future retiree
coverage. To arrive at a cost figure, the two sides had to decide what rate of
medical inflation to use. Since standard actuarial projections for retiree
health obligations range over 80 years, even a percentage point can have a
huge effect on the size of the total cost. Eventually, the two sides settled on
5 percent as a long-term average for US health-care cost increases (GM
Corporation 2007a).
At first blush, this seems wildly optimistic given the double-digit increases
of recent years. Yet many experts use something in that ballpark for long-
term projections, on the assumption that the current pace is simply unsus-
tainable over many decades.1 Still, by agreeing to what today seems like a
relatively low assumption, the UAW made the sum to be funded more
affordable to GM. In doing so, it also may have heightened the risk that
the VEBA will face shortfalls, especially in the short to medium term, for
which retirees and the union will be responsible. Those risks will heighten
drastically if GM follows Ford’s lead in 2009 and substitutes stock for half of
the funding it had agreed to in 2007.
The 5 percent medical inflation assumption resulted in a present-value
estimate of GM’s long-term retiree health obligation that totaled roughly
$47 billion in 2007 (GM Corporation 2007a). This figure represented the
cost as of that time of covering all current retirees and their dependents, as
well as all currently active UAW members at GM and their dependents. It
excluded any new hires GM might make in the future, who will not be part
of the new VEBA. Union members hired after September 2007 will receive
$1 per compensated hour that will go toward covering their retiree health-
care costs, a significant reduction in benefits compared to existing UAW
members (GM Corporation 2007a).
The UAW also agreed to a relatively generous figure for the second
critical financial assumption, about projected returns. Just as the 5 percent
medical inflation assumption made the long-term cost more manageable
for GM, a high assumed rate of return allowed the two sides to put up less
money to meet that cost. Ultimately, the two sides settled on 9 percent,
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even though GM said it would employ a much more pessimistic 6 percent
on its own books.2 The higher figure meant that GM only needed to come
up with about $38 billion, instead of $47 billion, for the VEBA to be
considered fully funded.3
This 9 percent rate of return was probably a reasonable assumption for
both sides (perhaps even after the market crash that began in the fall of
2008). While GM’s own accounting assumption of 6 percent suggested that
it may be optimistic, the rate is actually a bit less than the 10 percent long-
term average that stocks have returned over the decades. Since the VEBA
trust is designed to last for many decades, it made sense to use a rate
matching that time horizon (or it seemed so prior to the 2008 market
crash). However, it did mean that the trust lacked a large cushion to buffer
the inevitable fluctuations in returns, much less a full-scale collapse such as
occurred in 2008. If returns slump for many years, trust officials may be
forced to reduce benefits at least temporarily, until the stock markets
recover.
The two sides reached another series of intricate compromises in 2007
on the divisive issue of how much each of them would contribute toward
the $38 billion in required funding. In some sense, union members paid
for the entire sum, since the contributions GM agreed to make were given
in exchange for job, wage, and work-rule concessions. Still, GM agreed to
Table 13.1 Funding for the General Motors (GM) 2007 Voluntary Employee
Benefit Association (VEBA)
Source Amount ($ billions)
Panel 1: From GM
Transfer from existing VEBA 16.0
Cost of paying retiree health until VEBA starts in 2010 5.4
Convertible note 4.37
Backstop payments 1.74
Excess pension funds 1.7
2005 payment due in 2011 1.0
Subtotal 30.21
Panel 2: From the United Auto Workers
Diverted 2005 wage hikes and cost of living adjustments 5.6
Diverted 2007 wage hikes and cost of living adjustments 2.5
Subtotal 8.1
Total 38.31
Source : Author’s calculations derived from General Motors Corporation (2007a, 2007b).
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put up slightly more than $30 billion of the total directly, while UAW
workers agreed to pay for the remaining $8 billion by diverting future pay
hikes into the VEBA. Next, we offer more detail on each party’s contribu-
tions (see also Table 13.1).
Sources of GM’s Contribution
GM’s financial cost was made easier by the $16 billion already saved in the
internal VEBA it had set up years ago. The money served as a convenient
base on which to build the new defeasance VEBA. Much of the rest of GM’s
contribution came from financial moves that also will not require new cash
outlays by the financially strapped company. The two sides agreed to count
as part of the VEBA funding the $5.4 billion GM will pay to continue the
current DB retiree health plan through the end of 2009, until the new
VEBA is up and running (the start date was set for January 1, 2010.)
The UAW accepted another $4.3725 billion in the form of a note con-
vertible to GM stock. After the note was issued in January 2008, it will
require GM to make semiannual interest payments to the trust. Six months
before the note matures in 5 years, the trust will have the right to convert
it into about 109 million shares of GM stock, based on a $40 conversion
price. It can do so before if GM shares exceed $48. While the note is not a
straight stock grant, it is also not as solid as cash and thus introduces more
uncertainty into the VEBA’s long-term financial outlook. For example, if
GM declared bankruptcy, the note would rank as unsecured and unsubor-
dinated debt. As a result, it would stand a lower chance of full recovery
relative to more senior debt and might well be all but wiped out, a common
occurrence with such debt in bankruptcy.
Similarly, if the trust converts the note into GM shares, their value would
fluctuate with the market price. In a bankruptcy, their worth would very
likely fall close to zero. In addition, the agreement puts strict limits on the
VEBA’s ability to convert the note. For example, it cannot be sold or even
hedged until 2010 without GM’s consent. After that date, the trust only can
sell about half of the note or converted stock per year. And it cannot sell
more than 2 percent of it to one owner. Another significant restriction
requires the trust to vote the stock in the same proportion as all other GM
shareholders, which effectively deprives the VEBA (and hence the union,
which appoints the trustees) of the ownership power to exercise corporate
governance rights over GM.
Of course, the note offers the VEBA a potential upside, just as any stock
ownership does. The trust stands to gain more than $1 billion for every $10
increase in GM shares over the $40 conversion price. In addition, such a
large ownership stake – 109 million shares will represent about 16 percent
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of GM’s outstanding stock – will link the UAW to GM in a new way. A recent
Citigroup report said: ‘We view the UAW’s willingness to accept a $4.4
billion convertible note . . . as a positive seeing that both sides’ interests
should be better aligned going forward. The UAW’s desire to hold an
equity-linked security in the VEBA may also suggest that the union sees
future upside potential in GM shares’ (Michaeli, Randow, and Reenock
2007).
To allay UAW concerns that the trust might not earn enough to cover
future costs, GM has also agreed to make $1.74 billion in twenty annual
contingency payments, with the first $165 million guaranteed to be paid in
April 2008. These constitute a backstop to take effect if the VEBA’s returns
fall below projections. GM further agreed to make a payment in any year in
which the trust’s cash flow projection shows that it lacks enough money to
cover all benefit costs over the ensuing 25 years. Nevertheless, even before
the 2008 market crash threw out all of the 2007 cost projections, it was likely
that the company would have been required to make most or all of the
payments, since they were included in the union’s analysis that $38 billion
would fully fund current retiree health benefits over the long term (UAW
2007).
Another $1.7 billion came from what appeared to be an innovative
maneuver to tap excess cash in GM’s pension plan. In 2003, the company
injected $13.5 billion into the plan from a bond offering and another $5
billion from selling its stake in Hughes Electronics (Sloan 2005). By 2007,
the pension was overfunded by $17 billion (Michaeli, Randow, and Re-
enock 2007), but under federal pension rules the overfunding was insuffi-
cient to allow GM to withdraw money to use for the VEBA. Instead, the
union agreed to require retirees to contribute $51.67 a month to the VEBA,
and offset the cost by a grant GM will make of a special monthly pension
increase of $66.70 (GM Corporation 2007b). The pension pass-through, as
it is called, was expected to generate $1.7 billion for the VEBA (in present-
value terms) at no cost to retirees.
A last part of the funding from GM came from the final $1 billion
payment due in 2011 that GM had promised during the 2005 mid-contract
cutbacks, which the parties agreed to count toward the new VEBA.
Sources of UAW’s Contributions
Union members’ largest sacrifice for the VEBA came from the $5.6 billion
in wage hikes and COLAs it had agreed in 2005 to divert to retiree health
care, to offset the $17 billion in cuts made that year. The UAW also granted
GM the option of spreading out the payments over 13 years.4 During
negotiations over the new VEBA in 2007, the UAW agreed to redirect
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additional wage and COLA increases it had negotiated, which added an-
other $2.5 billion.
These complex series of compromises made sense in 2007, before the
global recession hit in 2008. By the time the UAW agreed to accept stock for
up to half of what Ford had agreed to put up for the VEBA it had agreed to
in 2007, GM was essentially bankrupt and on life support from the US
government (Bunkley 2009). At this point, the UAW faced a calculation
similar to the one it made in 2007, although a more drastic one. It could
agree to take more stock to fund the VEBAs at the three companies,
dramatically increasing the likelihood that retirees would face steep benefit
cuts should the companies recover slowly, as seemed probable. Or it could
refuse and risk a bankruptcy filing that would very likely end all retiree
health coverage.
One of the few positive conclusions about the events of 2009 is that they
illustrated the remarkably flexible nature of VEBAs. At all three auto
companies, UAW retirees now face a much greater risk that they would
not receive the health coverage anticipated when the VEBA was agreed on
in 2007. Yet they do still have a trust fund, and if the economy and the
company recover, it is possible that they could enjoy everything agreed on
back then. GM’s situation was more dire than Ford’s in 2009, as was
Chrysler’s, but the VEBA structure gives retirees there at least the possibility
of future coverage. Without it, they almost certainly would be left with
nothing after the companies’ near collapse.
Furthermore, it is entirely possible that the companies may not have
freed themselves of their retiree obligations despite the elaborate effort
represented by the defeasance VEBAs. For example, the agreement the
UAW and GM reached in 2007 stated that
The UAW and the Covered Group may not negotiate to increase any of the funding
obligations set out herein. The UAW also agrees not to seek to obligate GM to: (i)
provide any additional contributions to the New VEBA; (ii) make any other pay-
ments for the purpose of providing Retiree Medical Benefits to the Covered Group;
or (iii) provide Retiree Medical Benefits through any other means to the covered
Group. (GM Corporation 2007b)
Presumably, such explicit language is sufficient to convince the Securities
and Exchange Commission that GM no longer will bear responsibility for
UAW retiree medical coverage and therefore can wipe the billions in FAS
106 debt off its books.
It should also be noted that, directly following the earlier language, was a
second sentence which said: ‘Provided, that, to the extent that may be
proposed by the UAW, employees are permitted to make contributions to
the New VEBA of amounts otherwise payable in profit sharing, COLA,
wages and/or signing bonuses’(GM Corporation 2007b). This second
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clause left open the door to new bargaining over retiree health in the
future. If the current contract helps GM to prosper again, as it was designed
to do, there appears to be little to stop the UAW from demanding pay or
profit-sharing increases large enough to satisfy active workers and still leave
some left over for the VEBA.
In fact, from the perspective of GM’s legal position, its entire battle for
the defeasance VEBA would seem to have changed nothing. The company
maintained in court that it never had a legal obligation to pay for retiree
health care and could terminate it at any time. In this view, the only reason
management kept spending billions every year was to avoid a strike by the
union. That is exactly the position GM will be in once the new VEBA is set
up: the union will be free to threaten work actions to extract promised
payments for retiree care that could easily mount into the billions again.
The company’s legal theory was never tested by the courts, and it is entirely
possible that the union would have prevailed in its view that retiree health
benefits were indeed a legal debt GM was obligated to cover. Even so, there
would appear to be little to prevent the UAW from demanding more
payments from a healthy GM in the future.
VEBAs such as those set up in Detroit present a mixed set of problems for
unions. They do offer several advantages over employer-provided insur-
ance, most significantly, they put workers in the driver’s seat. The GM
model will be a stand-alone entity controlled by a board of five UAW-
appointed trustees and six public ones whose sole responsibility will be to
the beneficiaries (UAW 2008). The trustees can choose a mix of benefits
that best suit workers’ needs without input from employers. Such stand-
alone VEBAs also can help protect both active and retired union members
from cutbacks by employers. In addition, such trusts can offer a fair degree
of insulation from employer bankruptcy, depending on how well funded
they are and how much employer stock they hold. But the disadvantages
could very well outweigh these gains.
The flip side of the control an employee VEBA conveys to workers is the
risk it brings. When employers pay for retiree health benefits, they bear the
cost of future medical inflation. With a stand-alone VEBA, workers and
retirees do. If trust assets fail to earn enough to keep pace, as seemed highly
likely with the automakers in early 2009, unions will need to make the
painful decisions about how to cope. Employees also must deal with any
financial deficiencies or even failures caused by mismanagement of an
employee VEBA. Employee VEBAs can lead to an even greater level of
risk if they are set up from the beginning with insufficient funds. If a union
has the clout to convince employers to set up fully funded VEBAs, the
independence they offer conceivably might be worth the extra risk. But
even prosperous unionized companies may seek VEBAs that sever their
retiree health obligations at a discount.
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In sum, however, even less than fully funded defeasance VEBAs may be
better than the alternative. Both GM and Goodyear threatened to reduce
retiree health coverage or eliminate it altogether if they did not agree to
sever the company’s retiree health liability. Given the uncertainties that
would be involved in litigation over such actions, unions facing them run a
very real risk of losing all retiree coverage. Similarly, a VEBA half funded by
stock in threatened companies is highly risky, but perhaps better than
nothing at all.
Discussion
Experts have long suggested that the VEBA concept could also help other
employers and employees better manage the mounting cost of retiree
health insurance (Macey and O’Donnell 2003; Richardson and Salemi
2007). For instance, public-sector employers may attempt to use VEBAs to
shake off burdensome legacy costs, as some analysts began urging them to
do after GM succeeded (Miller 2007). But given the different political
dynamics of government employment, defeasance could be even more
difficult for them to achieve than it has been for corporations. Public-sector
legacy-cost pressure is strikingly similar to that in the private sector, though
many public employers have focused on the issue only recently. Some
estimates peg the total unfunded public-sector liability for retiree health
benefits at close to $1 trillion (Miller 2007). The subject has gained new
urgency due to the same kind of mandate to report these unfunded
obligations that FAS 106 placed on private companies. Several years ago,
the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), the FASB equiva-
lent for state and local governments, issued new standards called State-
ments Number 43 and Number 45. For fiscal years beginning after
December 2006, these require public employers to report their full retiree
health liability to taxpayers just as corporations must do, creating similar
pressure on them to deal with the problem (Segal Bulletin 2004). Some
have already set up internal VEBAs or other pre-funding schemes to cope
with the newly visible liability.5 For example, of the 41 states that pay for
some or all retiree health coverage, 30 use the pay-as-you-go method, while
11 pre-fund (Wisniewski and Wisniewski 2004). All those not pre-funding,
including counties, municipalities, and other local entities, now must
struggle with how to respond to the new accounting rules.
Though the cost burden on some public employers may be just as
crushing as it is on some private ones, the response is different. To begin
with, public entities do not pay taxes, so there is no tax advantage to them
in setting up a tax-free trust like a VEBA. The political nature of govern-
ments also poses potential barriers to defeasance that corporations do not
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face. The beneficiaries usually are voters, which gives them opportunities to
object to such efforts that private-sector workers do not have. In addition,
most states and larger counties and cities pay for Medicaid, public hospi-
tals, and other public health programs that service the indigent. So if a
public entity did curtail retiree health-care coverage, leaving some retirees
unable to cover medical expenses, the public sector could find itself pick-
ing up some of the tab anyway. Such concerns could make it difficult to
emulate the automakers and remove future hires from a retiree health
plan.
Still, public employers do have powerful incentives to pre-fund retiree
health through a VEBA or other plan, even if they cannot sever the liability
through a defeasance approach. Those that continue the pay-as-you-go
approach as large future obligations appear on their books may have to
pay more to borrow, if the bond market deems them less creditworthy and
requires higher interest rates on future efforts to raise money in the capital
markets. Pre-funding also could lead to future cost saving. Although setting
up a trust requires higher outlays than continuing to make annual pay-
ments, as the trust starts to earn a return, the investment income will cover
more of the cost. Eventually, pre-funding even could lead to lower yearly
outlays (Wisniewski and Wisniewski 2004).
In addition, pre-funding allows public entities to post a lower liability on
their books. It does not alter the actual amount they must pay out to
retirees in future years, but GASB’s accounting rules require governments
using pay-as-you-go accounting to use short-term interest rates to calculate
the obligation (Segal Bulletin 2005). By contrast, if they set aside money in
a trust like a VEBA, they can use long-term rates, which typically are higher.
Doing so cuts the size of the measured obligation, just as GM was able to do
by using a 9 percent return assumption with the UAW instead of the 6
percent it used with Wall Street. The rationale is that money not in a trust is
not necessarily going to be available for long-term investments that histori-
cally earn higher average returns.
These benefits must be weighed against the extra up-front outlays that
pre-funding requires. Such investments can be extremely expensive, up to
10 times as much as what is required on a pay-as-you-go basis (Segal Public
Sector Letter 2007a). Public entities spend their annual budgets on educa-
tion, police, or other services. Pre-funding retiree health benefits requires
them to divert scarce resources from these other needs, often essential
ones, which many may be reluctant to do. Similarly, many governments
have other long-term obligations to fund such as bonds floated to build
roads or schools, and they may not want to sink resources into retiree
health coverage instead. In addition, the funds put in a VEBA trust cannot
be tapped should a budget deficit or other fiscal crisis hit in the future.
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VEBA pre-funding also raises difficult issues of intergenerational equity
among taxpayers. When a city or state uses pay-as-you-go accounting for
retiree medical coverage, current taxpayers usually are paying for services
enjoyed by prior generations of taxpayers. They are also usually shifting
costs for workers serving them today onto tomorrow’s taxpayers. No gener-
ation necessarily comes out ahead or behind, since the cost each bears
depends on medical inflation and the relative level of service provided in
each era (Wisniewski and Wisniewski 2004). A VEBA or other pre-funding
scheme sets up a system in which each taxpayer generation comes closer to
paying for the deferred compensation of the employees whose service they
receive. This could be perceived as enhanced intergenerational equity. Of
course, even if it is, one or more generations must pay the transition costs
required for the initial pre-funding payments. It is also difficult to make
accurate predictions about medical inflation and other assumptions, which
could place too much cost on a particular generation.
For workers in the private sector, VEBA tax advantages could prove
beneficial depending on the circumstances of their employment. Under
current law, even organized workers’ VEBA contributions are taxable if the
trust is funded entirely by employees (although the earnings the trust
makes accumulate tax-free just like a retirement account; see Macey and
O’Donnell 2003). One way to extend the full tax break to them would be
for the employer to contribute, even if the amount were small. Failing that,
it is possible that an employer could emulate GM and Goodyear, and divert
wage hikes and/or profit-sharing into a VEBA. Although such funds would
come out of the pockets of employees, it would be by far the most tax-
friendly way for them to save for retiree coverage. However, this model has
not been tested, and it is possible that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
or the Department of Labor would look askance at the idea.
Because federal law denies many of the VEBA tax advantages to non-
union workers, independent employee trusts are more difficult to set up
for the majority of the workforce that today lacks retiree coverage (Fronstin
2005). While nonunion employers can make contributions to a VEBA
if they wish, there are strict limits on the amounts (Macey 2007), and
employee contributions are after-tax whether the employer contributes or
the entire burden is borne by employees. Because of the latter limitation,
the relatively few nonunion employer-pay-all VEBAs tend to have few
participants (Macey and O’Donnell 2003). Conceivably, nonunion employ-
ers also could use a GM-style wage or profit-sharing diversions to set up an
employee-pay-all VEBA that would enjoy all the tax breaks of a union plan.
The IRS requires fully deductible VEBA contributions to be mandatory, so
that employees cannot choose between cash and the contribution. Typical-
ly, this is done through a union, which bargains rules that apply to all
members (McGuinness 2007; Richardson and Salemi 2007).
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One model in a nonunion setting could be for the employer to set up an
automatic VEBA contribution with an opt-out provision, much like the
rules that allow employers to set up automatic payroll deductions for 401
(k)s. Such an arrangement could be considered as mandatory as union
membership, which is voluntary in most circumstances. However, this
strategy has not been tested and the IRS might not consider it mandatory
enough to satisfy the requirement of a VEBA.
The most straightforward way to help workers save for retiree health care
would be a change in federal tax law. Currently, the only tools available are
DB pensions and DC plans like 401(k)s. But the money that workers
withdraw in retirement from such plans is taxed, even if spent on health
care. There is nothing in federal tax law today like an employer medical
plan or a Flexible Savings Account, which retirees can use to purchase
health care on a pretax basis. One option would be for Congress to pass a
law allowing money spent on health care to be withdrawn on a pretax basis
from pensions or 401(k)s. Another would be to allow pretax contributions
to employee-pay-all VEBAs, which would serve much the same purpose. Of
course, new tax breaks could cost many billions, depending on how exten-
sively they were used. Major new tax burdens would likely prove politically
divisive, especially in light of all the worries about Social Security and
Medicare under funding.
Conclusion
The larger problem with any VEBA-like remedy for falling retiree health
coverage is that it would do little to address the central issue facing both
retired and active workers, which is the ever-increasing cost and lack of
affordable health-care coverage. Already, many Americans are uninsured
or underinsured because they can not afford the premiums, co-pays, and
deductibles. Giving them a new tax-free saving plan may be better than
nothing, but it would likely not be enough to offset double-digit medical
inflation. And since many workers already are struggling with stagnant
wages, they might be unable to save enough to fund a significant portion
of their retiree health needs. As a result, VEBAs may be little more than a
Band-Aid able to help some workers get by until a more comprehensive
solution arrives.
Congress and the White House were engaged in serious debates about
just such a solution throughout the first year of the new Obama Adminis-
tration. Prospects for national health-care reform remain uncertain, the
passage of such legislation could mean that stand-alone VEBAs would turn
out to be a real windfall for UAW members, depending on how the law is
written. If a new system provided workers with access to affordable care,
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UAWmembers and others with extra funds saved in a VEBA could be much
better off. The stock and other funds contributed by the automakers
cannot be removed after they are put in to VEBA trusts, which means
that union participants could use them to supplement any new national
health system. They also would come out ahead if reforms moderated
medical inflation, which would improve the odds that VEBAs would not
run out of money. While the UAW did not agree to VEBAs with this goal in
mind, the union has been actively backing reform proposals, in which case
employee VEBAs could turn out to be an unexpected cushion for its
members.
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Notes
1 For example, Medicare projects national health-care expenditures over a 75-year
time horizon. In recent years, they have exceeded the gross domestic product
(GDP) of the Unites States by several percentage points a year. However, Medi-
care’s standard assumption is that over the next 75 years, expenditures will
gradually decline to a long-term growth rate of 1 percentage point over GDP,
which put health-care spending increases in the range of 5 percent a year. ‘The
theory behind this model is that, should medical technology continue to increase
rapidly, and expensively, in the future, then eventually society would be unwilling
and unable to devote a steadily increasing share of its income to obtaining better
health’ (Board of Trustees 2008: 168).
2 A by-product of this decision was that GM will be able to treat the difference
between these two figures as a profit. In 2007, the company estimated that its
annual earnings would increase by $2.6 billion to $3.6 billion starting in 2010 as a
result of the two different rate-of-return assumptions (although the figure could
decline somewhat in subsequent years).
3 The $38 billion would come close to $47 billion under a 6 percent discount rate,
according to the UAW (GM Corporation 2007a, 2007b).
4 The dollar value of these contributions may change because they are based on
hours worked, which will fall below projections as GM continues to downsize.
5 In addition to VEBAs, public employers also can use Internal Revenue Code
Section 401(h) accounts or Section 115 trusts to pre-fund post-employment
benefits such as retiree health care. Most that already have pre-funded have
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used 115 trusts, although that may change now that Goodyear and the auto-
makers brought visibility to VEBAs, which allows them to set up trusts for essential
purposes (Segal Public Sector Letter 2007b).
References
Arndt, Michael (2003). ‘Salvation from the Shop Floor,’ BusinessWeek, February 3.
Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary
Medical Insurance Trust (Board of Trustees) (2008). Annual Report. Washington,
DC: US Department of Health and Human Services. http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2008.pdf
Bunkley, Nick (2009). ‘U.A.W. Agrees to Concessions at Ford,’ New York Times,
February 24: B3.
Byrnes, Nanette (2003). ‘Is Wilbur Ross Crazy,’ BusinessWeek, December 22.
Employee Benefit Research Institute (2005). ‘Retiree Health Benefits,’ in Funda-
mentals of Employee Benefit Programs. Washington, DC: Employee Benefits Research
Institute.
Fronstin, Paul (2005). ‘The Impact of the Erosion of Retiree Health Benefits on
Workers and Retirees,’ EBRI Issue Brief 279. Washington, DC: Employee Benefits
Research Institute.
General Motors (GM) Corporation (2007a). GM 2007 GM-UAW Labor Agreement.
Detroit, MI: General Motors Corporation. http://media.corporate-ir.
net/media_files/irol/84/84530/2007_GM_UAW_Labor_Agreement_Call.pdf
——(2007b). Form 8-K Filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission. Detroit, MI:
General Motors Corporation.
——(2009a). 2009–2014 Restructuring Plan. Detroit, MI: General Motors Corpora-
tion. http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/AIFP/GMRestructuringPlan.pdf
——(2009b). The New General Motors Company Launches Today. Detroit, MI: General
Motors Corporation. http://gm-volt.com/2009/07/10/gm-exits-bankruptcy-
today-the-new-gm-starts-now/
Ghilarducci, Teresa (2008). The New Treaty of Detroit: Are VEBAs Labor’s Way Forward or
the Remnants of a Glorious Past? Cambridge, MA. http://www.law.harvard.edu/
programs/lwp/PDF_pres/GHIL%20VEBA.pdf
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (various years). Internal Revenue Service Data Books.
Washington, DC: Internal Revenue Service.
Linebaugh, Kate (2009). ‘Five Chrysler Directors Are Named,’ Wall Street Journal,
July 7: B2.
Macey, Scott J. (2007). Author interview, November 9.
——and George O’Donnell (2003). ‘Chapter 8,’ in New York University Review of
Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation – 2003. Albany, NY: Matthew Bender &
Co. Inc.
Maynard, Micheline and Mary Chapman (2007). ‘G.M. Pact Calls for a Push for
Health Care Reform,’ New York Times, October 6.
McGuinness, Jeffrey C. (2007). ‘Recent Prominent Agreements Renew Interest in
VEBAs.’ Memorandum 07-119. Washington, DC: HR Policy Association.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/7/2010, SPi
262 Aaron Bernstein
Michaeli, Itay, Will Randow, and Christopher Reenock (2007). ‘Company Flash
on General Motors Corp,’ Citigroup Global Markets Equity Research. New York:
Citigroup.
Miller, Girard (2007). A Lesson from Detroit. Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly.
Mittal Steel USA (2006). Summary Annual Report for Mittal Steel USA Inc. Retiree Drug
Plan. London: ArcelorMittal.
National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems (NCPERS) (2006).
Creating a Retiree Medical Trust: How Employers & Employees Can Use Pre-Tax Dollars to
Fund Their Retiree Medical Costs. Washington, DC: NCPERS. http://www.ncpers.
org/Files/HealthCare/RMTreports_2Ed.pdf
O’Conner, Brian J. (2007). ‘Most Call VEBA Good Deal for GM,’ The Detroit News,
September 27.
Richardson, Michael I. and Daniel Salemi (2007). ‘Funding Postretirement Health
Benefits Through a VEBA,’ Benefits & Compensation Digest, 44(9): 26–31.
Schultz, Ellen E., and Theo Francis (2007). ‘What Might GM Trust Fund Mean for
Workers Elsewhere?,’ The Wall Street Journal, September 27: A14.
Segal Bulletin (2004). Accounting and Financial Reporting for Postemployment Benefits
Other than Pensions: GASB’s Final Standards. New York: The Segal Company.
http://www.segalco.com/publications/bulletins/aug04GASB.pdf
——(2005). GASB Issues Long-Awaited OPEB Implementation Guide. New York:
The Segal Company. http://www.segalco.com/publications/bulletins/oct05
OPEBguide.pdf
Segal Public Sector Letter (2007a). Retiree Health Care: Implications of OPEB Liabilities.
New York: The Segal Company. http://www.segalco.com/publications/publicsec-
torletters/aug2007.pdf
——(2007b). In Search of OPEB Remedies: Good Medicine Includes Managing Retiree
Health Costs. New York: The Segal Company. http://www.segalco.com/govern-
ment/pub-govt.cfm?ID=776
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (2007). UAW et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al.
Nos. 06-1475/2064. Washington, DC: Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Sloan, Allen (2005). ‘Multibillion Gamble Put GM Pension Funds on the Road to
Independence,’ Washington Post, July 5.
United Auto Workers (UAW) (2007). UAW GM Report: A Message to UAW GM Retirees.
Detroit, MI: United Auto Workers. http://www.uaw.org/contracts/07/gm/gm07.
php
——(2008). UAW, Union Retirees File Proposed Settlement Establishing VEBA Trust.
Detroit, MI: United Auto Workers. http://www.uaw.org/news/newsarticle.cfm?
ArtId=463
United Steelworkers (USW) (2002). Exhibit A-6, Retiree Benefit Trust, 2002 USW Labor
Agreement with ISG Inc. Pittsburgh, PA: United Steelworkers.
——(2003). Restructuring American Steel. Pittsburgh, PA: United Steelworkers.
http://www.usw.org/our_union/workplaces?id=0004
——(2006). New Benefit Is Latest Innovation in USW’s Continuing Commitment to
Retirees’ Security. Pittsburgh, PA: United Steelworkers. http://benefitslink.com/
pr/detail.php?id=39865
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/7/2010, SPi
Retiree Health-Care VEBAs 263
——(2007a). United Steelworker Retirees to Receive Additional Benefits in 2007. Pitts-
burgh, PA: United Steelworkers. http://legacy.usw.org/usw/program/content/
4039.php
——(2007b). Questions and Answers About the 2007 Medicare Part B Premium Reimburse-
ment Benefit. Pittsburgh, PA: United Steelworkers. http://www.usw.org/usw/pro-
gram/adminlinks/docs//Mittal%20VEBA%20Q%;20and%20A%20Medicare%
20Part%20B%20Benefit.pdf
Welch, David and Nanette Byrnes (2007). ‘Is GM’s Health Plan Contagious?,’
BusinessWeek, October 10.
Wisniewski, Stan and Lorel Wisniewski (2004). ‘State Government Retiree Health
Benefits: Current Status and Potential Impact of New Accounting Standards.’
Washington, DC: AARP Public Policy Institute. http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/
health/2004_08_benefits.pdf
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/7/2010, SPi
264 Aaron Bernstein
